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Abstract:
This paper studies situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not executed as planned. It is divided
into three parts. The ﬁrst part analyzes the case where the activities may be delayed; this possibly induces a delay
on the project as a whole with additional costs. Associated delayed project games are deﬁned and are shown to have
a nonempty core. The second part considers the case where the activities may be expedited; this possibly induces
an expedition of the project as a whole creating proﬁts. Corresponding expedited project games are introduced and
are shown to be convex. The third and last part studies situations where some activities may be delayed and some
activities may be expedited. Related project games are deﬁned and shown to have a nonempty core.
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1 Introduction
A project consists of a set of activities, for which the interconnections are known, being completed over a
period of time and intended to achieve a particular aim. Before the project is realized the time needed to
execute each of the activities is estimated and thus, in particular, a planned duration of the project can be
determined. In practice, the estimated duration and the duration after realization (or real duration) of an
activity may diﬀer and as result the real duration of the project may not coincide with its planned duration.
In many real-life situations, if a project is delayed some additional costs arise due to this delay. Moreover, if
the project is expedited some extra reward may be obtained. How to allocate the costs (rewards) due to the
delay (expedition) of the project among the activities that have caused this diﬀerence in duration? Moreover,
even if the real duration of the project is as planned, those activities that are delayed might compensate
those that have been expedited in avoiding a delay of the project.In the literature, the focus has been on projects where activities may be delayed but not expedited.
Berganti˜ nos and S´ anchez (2002) propose two rules to allocate the total delay of the project. They propose
to allocate ﬁrst the total delay among the paths in the project and then, in a second step, the delay assigned
to each path is attributed to the activities in the path. Branzˆ ei, Ferrari, Fragnelli and Tijs (2002) analyze
the problem of sharing the total delay of a project within the framework of taxation. Their proposal is to
consider an associated taxation problem (and associated rules) where the total delay of the project (total
tax) has to be allocated among the diﬀerent activities where the maximal ability to pay for each activity is
given by that activity’s own delay. By doing so, the underlying structure of the project, and especially the
slack of the various paths, is ignored. Finally, Castro and Tejada (2005), also in the same delayed project
setting, propose a parameterized family of rules stemming from the cost sharing literature. A common aspect
in these three papers is that game theoretical aspects are only indirectly present in analyzing the allocation
problem related to project situations.
In this article we will not only provide a direct approach based on cooperative game theory to analyze
allocation issues in delayed project situations but we also consider the opposite setting where activities may
be expedited but not delayed. Moreover, we will also analyze the mixed case where some activities may be
delayed and some activities may be expedited. Throughout we will assume that the associated reward and
cost functions are linear with respect to the diﬀerence of the planned and real project times. For a better
understanding of the rather technical general problem where some activities are delayed and some are expe-
dited, we will separately study the situations where all activities are either delayed or expedited. Moreover,
in case activities can not be delayed but only expedited stronger results can be obtained. Another reason
to treat delayed project problems separately is the direct connection to the usual setting in the literature.
Hence, three diﬀerent models are studied: delayed project problems (activities are possibly delayed), expe-
dited project problems (activities are possibly expedited), and project problems (activities may be delayed
or expedited). It is shown that (general) project games have a nonempty core, while expedited project games
are convex.
Section 2 introduces the deﬁnitions and terminology on projects. Section 3 studies delayed project prob-
lems. An associated delayed project game is introduced where the worth of a coalition measures the maximum
contribution of the coalition to the total delay of the project caused by those paths in which the coalition
is involved. It is shown that delayed project games have a nonempty core. In Section 4 we study expedited
project problems. First, we note that the total expedition can be divided in several parts depending on the
slack of the paths of the planned project. Besides, we distinguish between several levels of expedition that
can be claimed by a speciﬁc set of paths. Using such a “peeling of” approach, we deﬁne expedited project
games by applying ideas from bankruptcy games recursively to the various levels of the total expedition
in an interrelated way. Although expedited project games are not necessarily (strategically equivalent to)
2bankruptcy games, they turn out to be convex. Section 5 studies general project problems. We deﬁne an
associated project game where the underlying ideas of section 3 and 4 are combined. It is shown that project
games have a nonempty core.
2 Project situations
A project consists of a set of activities for which the inter-connections are known. These activities are
completed over a period of time and intended to achieve a particular aim. Let N denote the set of activities
of a project. Given an activity i ∈ N, let Pi denote the set of predecessors of i, i.e. the set of activities that
have to be processed before i can start. Analogously, let Fi be the set of followers of i, i.e. the set of activities
that need i to be completed before starting. A project will be deﬁned as a collection of ordered subsets of N
or paths, {N1,...,Nm}, where a bijection σt : {1,...|Nt|} → Nt describes the order in Nt, t ∈ {1,...,m},




(ii) Fσt(|Nt|) = ∅, Pσt(1) = ∅, and Pσt(r) = {σt(1),...,σt(r − 1)} for every t ∈ {1,...,m} and every
r ∈ {2,...,|Nt|};
(iii) for t,u ∈ {1,...,m}, if i,j ∈ Nt ∩ Nu with σ
−1
t (i) < σ
−1
t (j), then σ−1
u (i) < σ−1
u (j).
A project is called a parallel project if {N1,...,Nm} is a partition of N. Throughout there will be no speciﬁc
need to explicitly keep track of the ordering. Therefore, σ1,...,σm are suppressed from the notations.
Note that a project can be represented by a directed graph where the set of arcs corresponds to the set of
activities. In order to avoid multiple arcs dummy activities are introduced in the graph (a dummy activity
is an activity that does not consume neither time nor resources). Dummy activities will be represented by a
discontinuous arc.





Table 1: Predecessors of activities.
3Here, the set of activities is N = {A,B,C} and the collection of paths is {N1,N2}, with N1 = {A,C}, and
N2 = {B,C}. The graphical representation of this project is given in Figure 1.
1
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C
Figure 1: Representation of the project given in Table 1.
2
Associated to a project {N1,...,Nm} there is a function l : N → [0,∞) with l(i) denoting the length or
duration of activity i ∈ N. Given a project {N1,...,Nm} and a duration function l, we deﬁne the duration
of a path Nt, as the sum of the duration of its activities, i.e. as
 
i∈Nt l(i). The duration of the project





of Nt is the maximum time that the activities of Nt can be delayed without altering the duration of the
project, i.e. slack(Nt,l) = D(l) −
 
i∈Nt l(i). We say that a path is critical if it has slack zero.
Example 2.2. Consider the project given in Example 2.1 and let l : N → [0,∞) be given by l(A) = 3,




Table 2: Duration and slack of the paths.
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Throughout we will use a ﬁxed notation for two speciﬁc duration functions. We will denote by p : N →
[0,∞) the function representing the planned or estimated time of the activities and by r : N → [0,∞) the
function giving the real time of the activities after the realization of the project. We deﬁne the delay function
d : N → [0,∞) as d(i) = (r(i) − p(i))+(:= max{r(i) − p(i),0}), i.e. d(i) represents the delay of activity i.
Analogously, we deﬁne the expedition function e : N → [0,∞) as e(i) = (p(i)−r(i))+, i.e. e(i) represents the
expedition of activity i.
In the following sections we will study three kind of situations. Section 3 is devoted to delayed project
problems where r ≥ p. In Section 4 expedited project problems are studied, where r ≤ p. Finally, Section 5
analyzes the general situation.
43 Delayed project games
In this section we will study those project situations where activities may be delayed but not expedited,
which possibly causes the real duration of the project to be larger than the planned duration. A cost is
associated to the delay of the project which will be assumed linear w.r.t. the total delay of the project. Due
to the linearity of the cost function, we can identify the total cost with the total delay of the project. We
will analyze the corresponding allocation problem with techniques from cooperative TU games.
Before starting our discussion we will recall some basic concepts from game theory. A cooperative cost
game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N,c) where N is a ﬁnite set (the set of players)
and c : 2N → R represents the maximum amount of cost chargeable to the diﬀerent coalitions (or subsets of
players) satisfying c(∅) = 0. The core of a cost game (N,c) is deﬁned by






xi ≤ c(S) for all S ∈ 2N},
i.e. the core is the set of allocations of c(N) to which no coalition can reasonably object. An important
subclass of cost games with nonempty core is the class of concave games. A game (N,c) is said to be concave
if
c(T) + c(S) ≥ c(T ∪ S) + c(T ∩ S) (3.1)
for every S,T ⊂ N.
Now, we start our study on delayed project problems. We deﬁne delayed project problems as those project
problems where the planned time of the activities was underestimated, i.e. the real time of an activity is
at least its planned time. Hence, a delayed project problem can be described by ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) with
p ≤ r. To a delayed project problem we associate a delayed project game where the set of players is the
set of activities and the cost of a coalition is the maximal contribution of the coalition to the delay of the
project caused by those paths where members of S are involved. Formally, given a delayed project problem




























for every S ⊂ N, where P(S) = {t ∈ {1,...,m}| Nt ∩ S  = ∅} represents the set of paths in which S is
involved. Note that c(N) equals the total delay of the project.
Example 3.1. Consider the project given in Example 2.1 and let p : N → [0,∞) be given by p(A) = 3,
p(B) = 5, and p(C) = 2 and r : N → [0,∞) by r(A) = 6, r(B) = 9, and r(C) = 3. Table 3 gives the duration
of the paths according to the planned and real times.
5Nt Duration w.r.t. p Duration w.r.t. r
AC 5 9
BC 7 12
Table 3: Duration of the paths.
Hence, the planned duration of the project is D(p) = 7 while the real duration is D(r) = 12. There-
fore, there is a total delay of 5 units of time. The value of the associated delayed project game, (N,c), for
coalition {A,B} is obtained as follows: P({A,B}) = {1,2}, the contribution of {A,B} to the delay caused
by N1 is max{r(A) + r(C),D(p)} − max{p(A) + r(C),D(p)} = max{6 + 3,7} − max{3 + 3,7} = 2 and the
contribution of {A,B} to the delay caused by N2 is max{r(B) + r(C),D(p)} − max{p(B) + r(C),D(p)} =
max{9+3,7}−max{5+3,7} = 4, then c({A,B}) = max{2,4} = 4. All values of the game are: c({A}) = 2,
c({B}) = 4, c({C}) = 1, c({A,B}) = 4, c({A,C}) = 2, c({B,C}) = 5, c(N) = 5. 2
Next, we will give an alternative expression of the coalitional values in a delayed project game.


























for every S ⊂ N.






































































































































i∈Nt d(i) − slack(Nt,p)
 
+ = 0. Then
  
i∈Nt\S d(i) − slack(Nt,p)
 



















i∈Nt\S d(i) − slack(Nt,p)
 
+ = 0. Then,
 
i∈Nt\S d(i) − slack(Nt,p) ≤ 0 and hence
 
i∈Nt d(i) − slack(Nt,p) ≤
 
i∈Nt∩S d(i). Therefore,























i∈Nt\S d(i) − slack(Nt,p)
 
+ > 0. Then,
 
i∈Nt\S d(i) − slack(Nt,p) > 0 and hence
 


















Next, we will show that delayed project games have a nonempty core. To do this, we will ﬁrst study
delayed parallel project games. The following result states that subgames obtained by restricting delayed
parallel project games to the paths of the project are concave.
Lemma 3.2. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) be a delayed parallel project problem and let (N,c) be the associated
delayed project game. Then, (Nt,c|Nt) is concave for any t ∈ {1,...,m}.




i∈Nt d(i) − slack(Nt,p)
 
+}
for every S ⊂ Nt. Let S,T ⊂ Nt. We will show that
c|Nt(S) + c|Nt(T) ≥ c|Nt(S ∪ T) + c|Nt(S ∩ T).
We will distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: c|Nt(S) =
 
i∈S di and c|Nt(T) =
 
i∈T di. Hence, c|Nt(S ∩ T) =
 
i∈S∩T di and

































= c|Nt(S ∪ T) + c|Nt(S ∩ T).
7Case 2: c|Nt(S) =
  
i∈Nt d(i) − slack(Nt,p)
 
+. Hence, c|Nt(S ∪ T) =
  
i∈Nt d(i) − slack(Nt,p)
 
+ and















































= c|Nt(S ∪ T) + c|Nt(S ∩ T).
2
The next example illustrates that games arising from delayed parallel project problems need not be
concave.
Example 3.2. Consider the delayed parallel project problem ({N1,N2},p,r) with N1 = {A,B}, N2 =
{C,D,E}; p = (3,5,2,1,3); and r = (4,7,5,4,5). The project is represented in Figure 2. Let (N,c) be the
associated delayed parallel project game. Let S = {A,B,D} and T = {A,B,C}. Then, c(S) + c(T) = 3 + 3 =









Figure 2: Representation of the parallel project in Example 3.2.
2
Lemma 3.3. Delayed project games associated to delayed parallel project problems have a nonempty core.
Proof: Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) be a delayed parallel project problem and let (N,c) be the associated
game. Let Nt be a critical path in the realization. Hence, c(Nt) =
 
i∈Nt r(i)−D(p) = D(r)−D(p) = c(N).





yi if i ∈ Nt,
0 if i ∈ N \ Nt.






yi = c(Nt) = c(N)
8where the second equality holds because y ∈ Core(c|Nt) and c(Nt) = c|Nt(Nt), and the third one because Nt
is critical in the realization.
Next, we will show stability. If S ⊂ N \ Nt, then
 
i∈S xi = 0 ≤ c(S) because c is non-negative. Let






yi ≤ c|Nt(S ∩ Nt) = c(S ∩ Nt) ≤ c(S)
where the ﬁrst inequality holds because y ∈ Core(c|Nt) and the second because c(S) = maxu∈P(S){c(S∩Nu)}.
2
Theorem 3.4. Delayed project games have a nonempty core.
Proof: Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) be a delayed project problem and let (N,c) be the associated delayed
project game. Let ({N∗
1,...,N∗
m},p∗,r∗) be the delayed project problem deﬁned as follows: N∗
t = {it| i ∈
Nt}, with p∗(it) = p(i) and r∗(it) = r(i) for all i ∈ N. Note that ({N∗
1,...,N∗
m},p∗,r∗) is a delayed parallel
project problem with N∗ =
 m
t=1 N∗
t . Let (N∗,c∗) be the associated delayed project game. One readily
veriﬁes that, c(S) = c∗(S∗) for every S ⊂ N with S∗ :=
 m
t=1{it| i ∈ Nt ∩ S} ⊂ N∗.
By Lemma 3.3, there exists a y ∈ Core(c∗). Let x ∈ RN deﬁned as xi =
 m
t=1 yit. We will show that
x ∈ Core(c). Eﬃciency holds by construction of x, because y ∈ Core(c∗) and c(N) = c∗(N∗). Next, we will











yi ≤ c∗(S∗) = c(S)
2
4 Expedited project games
This section analyzes project situations in which activities may be expedited but not delayed. Consequently,
the duration of the project after realization may be shorter than the planned duration. A reward is associated
to the expedition of the project which will be assumed to be linear w.r.t. the total expedition of the project.
Again, due to the linearity of the reward function, we will identify the total reward with the total expedition
of the project.
Contrary to the previous section we are now in a reward setting. For this reason we will brieﬂy overview
concepts from reward games for our later purposes. A cooperative reward game in characteristic function
9form is an ordered pair (N,v) where N is a ﬁnite set of players and v : 2N → R is the function representing
the worth of each coalition, which satisﬁes v(∅) = 0. The core of a game (N,v) is deﬁned by






xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N},
i.e. the core is the set of eﬃcient allocations of v(N) to which no coalition can reasonably object. An
important subclass of games with nonempty core is the class of convex games (see Shapley (1971)). A game
(N,v) is said to be convex if
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T)1 (4.1)
for every i ∈ N and every S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i}.
We deﬁne expedited project problems as those project situations where the planned time of the activities
was overestimated, i.e. the real time of an activity is at most its planned time. Hence, an expedited project
problem can be described by a 3-tuple ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) with p ≥ r. We ﬁrst illustrate this kind of problem
by means of an example.
Example 4.1. Consider the expedited project problem ({N1,N2,N3},p,r) with N1 = {A,B}, N2 = {C},







Figure 3: Representation of the project in Example 4.1.
The total duration of the planned project is 10 units of time, while the real duration of the project after
realization is 6 units of time. Hence, the total expedition of the project is 4 units of time. Table 4 gives the
duration and slack of the paths according to the plan.





Table 4: Duration and slack of the paths according to the planned times.
Note that the project can not be expedited if the critical path N1 according to plan is not expedited.
Next, we will analyze how this total expedition is obtained. First, suppose that only the activities in N1 act
according to the realization while the activities in paths N2 and N3 act according to the plan. Then, the
project is expedited just 1 unit of time, while path N2 becomes critical, and path N3 has an slack of 2 units
of time in the new situation. Hence, path N1 is responsible by itself of 1 unit of time of the total expedition.
Second, suppose that the activities both in N1 and N2 act according to realization while the activities in N3
act according to plan. Then, N3 becomes critical and there is an additional expedition of 2 units of time.
Hence, both paths N1 and N2 are needed for and responsible of 2 units of time of the total expedition.
Finally, suppose that all the activities act according to realization, then there is an additional expedition
of 1 unit of time for which all paths N1, N2, and N3 are responsible. The contribution of the paths to the
total expedition of the project during the diﬀerent phases is summarized in Table 5. Note that the sum of
the ﬁrst row gives the total expedition of the project. This kind of “peeling of” into levels of expedition will
play a prominent role in the deﬁnition of expedited project games below.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
N1 1 2 1
N2 0 2 1
N3 0 0 1
Table 5: Contribution of the paths to the total expedition of the project.
2
Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) be an expedited project problem. We denote by I1 the set (of indices) of critical
paths according to the planned time. Formally,
I1 = {t ∈ {1,...,m}| slack(Nt,p) = 0}.
Recursively we deﬁne for k ≥ 2,
Ik =
 
t ∈ {1,...,m} \
k−1  
l=1






11i.e. Ik corresponds to all paths that would be critical in the (sub)project where all the paths in I1,...,Ik−1
were not present. We will denote by slack(Ik) the slack of the paths in Ik according to the planned time,
i.e. slack(Ik) = slack(Nt,p) for each t ∈ Ik. Let h be such that slack(Ih) < D(p) − D(r) ≤ slack(Ih+1). For






slack(Ik+1) − slack(Ik) if 1 ≤ k < h;
D(p) − D(r) − slack(Ih) if k = h.
Note that
 h
k=1 Ek = D(p) − D(r).
To an expedited project problem we associate an expedited project game. The set of players is the set
of activities. The worth of a coalition is the sum over all k ∈ {1,...,h} of those speciﬁc parts of the level
of expedition Ek for which the activities outside the coalition that are in paths of
 k
l=1 Il can not be held
responsible for anymore at that phase. Formally, given an expedited project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r)



























t∈Il Nt. Here, wk(S) represents the part of the level of expedition Ek that players in S
maximally would have to concede to players in the paths corresponding to
 k
l=1 Il outside S, taking into
account earlier concessions from the previous phases. Note that wk is non-negative. Moreover, v(N) equals
the total expedition of the project because wk(N) = 0 for any k ∈ {1,...,h}.
Example 4.2. Consider the expedited project problem given in Example 4.1. Recall that the problem was
given by ({N1,N2,N3},p,r) with N1 = {A,B}, N2 = {C}, and N3 = {D}; p = (6,4,9,7); and r = (3,2,4,6).
Here, D(p) = 10 and D(r) = 6. Hence, the total expedition is D(p) − D(r) = 4 units of time. Here, e =
(3,2,5,1); I1 = {1}, I2 = {2}, and I3 = {3}; and E1 = slack(I2)−slack(I1) = 1, E2 = slack(I3)−slack(I2) =






= min{2,1} = 1,
w2({A,C}) = min
 
e(B) − w1({A,C}), E2 
= min{2 − 1,2} = 1,
w3({A,C}) = min
 
e(B) + e(D) − w1({A,C}) − w2({A,C}), E3 
= min{2 + 1 − 1 − 1,1} = 1.
12Let (N,v) be the associated expedited project game. Then,
v({A,C}) = (E1 −w1({A,C})) +(E2 −w2({A,C}))+(E3 −w3({A,C})) = (1−1)+(2−1)+(1−1) = 1.
All coalitional worths are given by: v({A}) = v({B}) = v({C}) = v({D}) = 0, v({A,B}) = v({A,C}) = 1,
v({A,D}) = v({B,C}) = v({B,D}) = v({C,D}) = 0, v({A,B,C}) = 3, v({A,B,D}) = 1, v({A,C,D}) = 2,
v({B,C,D}) = 1, v(N) = 4. 2
Next, we introduce some extra notation. For R ⊂ N, A(R) denotes the set of “active levels of expedition”
of R, i.e.
A(R) := {k ∈ {1,...,h}| w
k(R) < E
k}.





maxA(R) if A(R)  = ∅;
0 if A(R) = ∅.
.
For j ∈ N, k(j) corresponds to the ﬁrst level of expedition in which j is involved, i.e.
k(j) := min{k ∈ {1,...,h}| j ∈ NIk}.
For R ⊂ N and j ∈ N, A(j,R) corresponds to the set of all active levels of expedition for R in which j is
also involved, i.e.
A(j,R) := {k ∈ {1,...,h}| k ≥ k(j), k ∈ A(R)}





minA(j,R) if A(j,R)  = ∅;
h + 1 if A(j,R) = ∅.
.
The following example illustrates the notation above.
Example 4.3. Consider the expedited project problem given in Examples 4.1 and 4.2. Let R = {A,C} and
i = B. Recall that N1 = {A,B}, N2 = {C}, and N3 = {D}. Furthermore, I1 = {1}, I2 = {2}, and I3 = {3}
and E1 = 1, E2 = 2, and E3 = 1. Moreover,
w1({A,C}) = 1 = E1,
w2({A,C}) = 1 < E2,
w
3({A,C}) = 1 = E
3.
Hence, A(R) = {2}, A(R) = 2, k(B) = 1, A(i,R) = {2} and a(i,R) = 2. 2
13The basic message of the following lemma is that, at each level of expedition, the concession of a smaller
coalition exceeds the concession of a larger coalition.
Lemma 4.1. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) be an expedited project problem. Let k ∈ {1,...,h}. Then, for every











l=1 NIl)\T e(i) −
 k−1
l=1 wl(T),
(ii) wk(S) ≥ wk(T),
(iii) A(S) ⊂ A(T).
Proof: Obviously, (ii) is a direct consequence of (i) and (iii) follows immediately from (ii).
Let S ⊂ T ⊂ N. We will show (i) by induction on k. For k = 1 it is obvious. Let k = 2. Then
 
i∈(NI1∪NI2)\S
































where the inequality holds because S ⊂ T.


















































































































where the inequality holds by induction together with S ⊂ T. 2
In the proof of the main convexity theorem we refer to some technical lemmas that can be found in the
appendix.
Theorem 4.2. Expedited project games are convex.
Proof: Let i ∈ N and S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i}. It suﬃces to show that
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T)
By Equation (4.2) it holds





l(S ∪ {i})] (4.4)
and
v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T) =
h  
l=1
[wl(T) − wl(T ∪ {i})] (4.5)
In order to show our result, we will distinguish between three cases.










wl(T) − wl(T ∪ {i})
 
the equality holds by Lemma A.3 and the inequality holds by Lemma 4.1 (ii).










wl(T) − wl(T ∪ {i})
 
Case 3: A(i,S) = ∅ and A(i,S ∪ {i})  = ∅. By Lemma 4.1 (iii), A(i,T ∪ {i})  = ∅. We will distinguish
between two subcases.
Subcase 3.1: A(i,T) = ∅. By Lemma A.1 (i) it holds wl(S) = wl(S ∪ {i}) and wl(T) = wl(T ∪ {i}) for
every l < k(i). Moreover, wl(S) = wl(T) = El for every l ≥ k(i) since A(i,S) = A(i,T) = ∅. Then,










































[El − wl(T ∪ {i})] −
h  
l=1
[El − wl(T)] = v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T)
where the inequality holds by Lemma 4.1 (ii).



















wl(T) − wl(T ∪ {i})
 
where the ﬁrst inequality holds by Equation (4.3) and the second because wk is non-negative for all
k ∈ {1,...,h}. 2
5 Project games
In this section we will study general project situations in which some activities may have suﬀered a delay
with respect to the planned time while other may have been expedited. The basis of analysis will be rewards
where costs are considered to be negative rewards. We will assume that the reward function is linear in the
diﬀerence between real duration and planned duration.
Let D = {i ∈ N| d(i) > 0} and E = {i ∈ N| e(i) > 0} denote the sets of delayed activities and expedited
activities, respectively. Associated to a (general) project problem ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) we deﬁne a project
game where the set of players is the set of activities and the worth of a coalition combines the underlying
ideas from sections 3 and 4. In determining the worth of a coalition we will pessimistically assume that
all delayed activities have indeed acted according to realization and that all expedited activities outside
the coalition have acted according to plan. Then, if the expedition given by the expedited activities in the
coalition itself is not enough to expedite the duration of the (planned) project, the worth of the coalition
will be negative and will be determined along the lines of delayed project games. Otherwise, the worth of
16the coalition will be positive and determined along the lines of expedited project games. Formally, given a





−c(S), if D(p|N\(D∪(E∩S)),r|D∪(E∩S)) ≥ D(p);
v(S), if D(p|N\(D∪(E∩S)),r|D∪(E∩S)) < D(p).
(5.1)
for every S ⊂ N.
Let D(p|N\(D∪(E∩S)),r|D∪(E∩S)) ≥ D(p). Then, c(S) reﬂects the maximum delay a coalition can be held
responsible for. Given a path Nt, coalition S can not be held responsible for more than its (positive) net
delay nor for more than the net delay of the path as a consequence of the delay of activities in the path and




































Note that Equation (5.2) applied to a coalition S with D(p|N\(D∪(E∩S)),r|D∪(E∩S)) < D(p) will give c(S) = 0.
Moreover,if D(r) ≥ D(p) then D(p|N\(D∪(E∩S)),r|D∪(E∩S)) ≥ D(p) for every S ⊂ N and hence u(S) = −c(S)
for every S ⊂ N.
Next, consider the case D(p|N\(D∪(E∩S)),r|D∪(E∩S)) < D(p). In order to deﬁne v(S) we need to introduce
some notation. We denote by rslack(Nt,p,r) the amount of remaining slack of a path w.r.t. the planned dura-
tion if only its delayed activities act according to realization, i.e. rslack(Nt,p,r) = slack(Nt,p)−
 
i∈Nt d(i).
Note that rslack(Nt,p,r) can be negative, meaning that the delayed activities have consumed all the initial
slack and would produce a delay on the project as a whole of −rslack(Nt,p,r) if the expedited activities
had acted according to plan. We denote by J1 the set of indexes of paths with remaining slack less than or
equal to zero:
J1 = {t ∈ {1,...,m}| rslack(Nt,p,r) ≤ 0}.
Recursively, we deﬁne for k ≥ 2
Jk =
 
t ∈ {1,...,m} \
k−1  
l=1






i.e. Jk contains all paths that would have smallest remaining slack if the paths in J1,...,Jk−1 where not
present. Set rslack(J1) := 0 and let rslack(Jk) denote the remaining slack of the paths in Jk for k ≥ 2,
i.e. rslack(Jk) = rslack(Nt,p,r) for each t ∈ Jk, k ≥ 2. Let g be such that rslack(Jg) < D(p) − D(r) ≤
rslack(Jg+1) if D(p)−D(r) > 0 and g = 0 otherwise. For k = 1,...,g, we deﬁne Fk as the level of expedition





rslack(Jk+1) − rslack(Jk) if 1 ≤ k < g;
D(p) − D(r) − rslack(Jg) if k = g.
Note that
 g
k=1 Fk = D(p) − D(r).
Next, we deﬁne v(S). By v(S) we represent the sum over all k = 1,...,g of those speciﬁc parts of the
corresponding level of expedition Fk for which expedited activities outside the coalition that are in paths of
 k










where wk(S) represents the part of the level of expedition Fk that players in S maximally would have to
concede to players in
 k




















for all k ∈ {1,...,g}, where NJl =
 
t∈Jl Nt. Note that Equations (5.3) and (5.4) applied to a coalition S
with D(p|N\(D∪(E∩S)),r|D∪(E∩S)) ≥ D(p) will give v(S) = 0.
Example 5.1. Consider the project problem ({N1,N2},p,r) with N1 = {A,B} and N2 = {C,D}. Let






Figure 4: Representation of the project in Example 5.1.
Here, D(p) = 9, slack(N1,p) = 2, slack(N2,p) = 0, D(r) = 8, d = (3,0,1,0), e = (0,2,0,3), D = {A,C},
E = {B,D}, rslack(N1,p,r) = −1, rslack(N2,p,r) = −1, J1 = {1,2}, g = 1 and F1 = 1. Note that the
project has been expedited 1 unit of time and hence u(N) = 1. We will explain in detail how to compute
the value of the associated project game for the coalitions {A,C,D} and {B,C,D}.
First, consider {A,C,D}. Since D(p|{B},r|{A,C,D}) = 10 > 9 = D(p), we have u({A,C,D}) = −c({A,C,D}).
In this case, P({A,C,D}) = {1,2}. The maximum amount chargeable w.r.t. path N1 is
min{(d(A) − e(A))+, (d(A) + d(B) − e(A) − slack(N1,p))+} = min{(3)+, (3 − 2)+} = 1
18and for path N2 this equals
min{(d(C)+d(D)−e(C)−e(D))+, (d(C)+d(D)−e(C)−e(D)−slack(N2,p))+} = min{(1−3)+, (1−3−0)+} = 0.
Hence, c({A,C,D}) = max{1,0} = 1. Therefore,
u({A,C,D}) = −c({A,C,D})) = −1.





= min{0,1} = 0,
and therefore v({B,C,D}) = F1 − w1({B,C,D}) = 1 − 0 = 1 and
u({B,C,D}) = 1.
The complete project game is given by: u({A}) = −1, u({B}) = 0, u({C}) = −1, u({D}) = 0, u({A,B}) =
0, u({A,C}) = u({A,D}) = u({B,C}) = −1, u({B,D}) = 1, u({C,D}) = 0, u({A,B,C}) = −1,
u({A,B,D}) = 1, u({A,C,D}) = −1, u({B,C,D}) = 1, u(N) = 1. 2
Theorem 5.1. Project games have a nonempty core.
Proof: Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) be a project problem and let (N,u) be the associated project game.
By the remarks above, it holds u(S) = v(S) − c(S) for every S ⊂ N. Hence, it suﬃces to show that (N,v)
and (N,c) have nonempty cores.
Note that the game (N,v) has a similar structure as an expedited project game (Jk is replaced by Ik,
Fk is substituted by Ek, and g is replaced by h). Moreover, the explicit deﬁnition of Ik, Ek, and h is not
relevant for the proof of Theorem 4.2. Therefore, it can be shown that (N,v) is convex according to the same
line of reasoning. Hence, (N,v) has a nonempty core.






























































































































Hence, c|Nt is the maximum of the zero(-sub)game with (a game which is strategically equivalent to) a con-
cave game according to Lemma 3.2.Therefore, (Nt,c|Nt) has a nonempty core. Subsequently, following the
same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.3, we can explicitly provide a core element for delayed parallel
project games. By applying the same translation technique as in the proof of Theorem 3.4, it follows that
(N,c) has a nonempty core in general. 2
Appendix
Lemma A.1. Let ({N1,...,Nm},p,r) be an expedited project problem. Let i ∈ N and S ⊂ N \{i}. Then,
the following statements hold.
(i) wk(S ∪ {i}) = wk(S) for all k < k(i).
(ii) Let A(i,S∪{i}) = ∅. Then, wk(S ∪{i}) = wk(S) for all k ≥ k(i) and consequently A(S ∪{i}) = A(S).
(iii) Let A(i,S)  = ∅. Then wk(S ∪ {i}) = wk(S) for all k > a(i,S) and consequently A(S ∪ {i}) = A(S).
Proof: (i) follows readily by deﬁnition of wk and (ii) by deﬁnition of A(i,S ∪ {i}) and the fact that
A(S) ⊂ A(S ∪ {i}). Next, we will show (iii). Let A(i,S)  = ∅. It is suﬃcient to show that
wk(S ∪ {i}) = wk(S) for all k > a(i,S) (A.1)



















By Lemma 4.1 (iii), a(i,S) ∈ A(S ∪ {i}). Then


























e(j) − e(i). (A.3)
We will show (A.1) by induction on k. First,
w

























e(j) − e(i) −














































where the second equality holds by Equation (A.3), and the fourth equality holds by Equation (A.2).
Let k > a(i,S) + 1 and suppose (A.1) holds for all levels from a(i,S) + 1 to k − 1,


























wl(S ∪ {i}) −
k−1  
l=a(i,S)+1












e(j) − e(i) −
























































where the third equality holds by Equation (A.3), the fourth equality holds by induction, and the ﬁfth one
by Equation (A.2). 2
21The following result provides an explicit expression for the sum of all concessions for a coalition S.
















































where the second equality holds because A(S) ∈ A(S) and by deﬁnition of wA(S)(S). 2










      
      
0 if A(i,S ∪ {i}) = ∅;










l(S) if A(i,S ∪ {i})  = ∅ and A(i,S) = ∅.





wl(S) − wl(S ∪ {i})
 
= 0.























where the ﬁrst equality holds by Lemma A.2 and the second by deﬁnition of A(S). Moreover
h  
l=1























where the ﬁrst equality holds by Lemma A.2, the second equality holds by Lemma A.1 (iii) and the third




wl(S) − wl(S ∪ {i})
 
= e(i).
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l=1 NIl)\S e(j) +
PA(S∪{i})
l=1 wl(S) = 0.
23